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GREED, GUNS AND GRIST:
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
ELIZABETH POWERS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Commercial sales of conventional weapons,1 military services, and
small arms and light weapons (SA/LW)2 net billions of dollars for U.S.
businesses each year.3 Military assistance (i.e., government-to-government
military aid) pours additional billions into the arms and military services
industry.4 In 2008 military assistance ranked third on the U.S. foreign aid
budget.5 Weapons sales and military assistance are the lifeblood of many
corrupt leaders. These leaders line their coffers with government money
meant to be used for military assistance purposes, and use the acquired
weaponry to engage in international antagonism and the repression of their
citizens.6
A glaring example of the negative effects of developing world arms
spending sprees is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo),7
where military assistance and United States-supplied weapons enabled
*

Elizabeth Powers is currently a law clerk for the Honorable Kristine DeMay. She received a
B.A. in political science and international relations from the University of Minnesota-Duluth in
2004 and a J.D. from William Mitchell College of Law in 2007.
1. RICHARD GRIMMETT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS
TO DEVELOPING NATIONS 1998-2005 89 (2006) [hereinafter GRIMMETT 1998-2005], available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33696.pdf. “Small arms” are defined as arms operated for
personal use; “light weapons” are arms that can be operated by a small group of people. The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General and Group of Governmental Experts on Small
Arms, 24 n.5, delivered to the General Assembly, UN DOC. A/54/258 (Aug. 19, 1999).
2. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS: U.S. EFFORTS TO
CONTROL THE AVAILABILITY OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS 7 (2000), http://
www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00141.pdf.
3. The Secretary-General, supra note 1, at 24 n.5.
4. CURT TARNOFF & LARRY NOWELS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, FOREIGN AID: AN
INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 7 (2004). In 2004, the U.S. spent
$4.791 billion in military aid. Id. at 29.
5. CONNIE VEILLETTE & SUSAN B. EPSTEIN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, STATE,
FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS: FY2008 APPROPRIATIONS 1 (2007). Military
aid outstripped humanitarian and multilateral aid. Id.
6. See Joe Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic
and Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 43 (1995) (summarizing various civil
liberties violations by African dictators).
7. The DR Congo changed names many times throughout its tenure as an independent country. While it may be historically incorrect to refer to the Democratic Republic of the Congo at all
times, for the sake of simplicity, the abbreviation “DR Congo” is used throughout this article.
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Mobutu Sese Seko (Mobutu) to retain power for over thirty years.8
Mobutu’s downfall precipitated the Congo Conflict, which has lasted for
over seven years and cost more than 3.8 million lives.9 The reverberations
of the Congo Conflict are still felt throughout Central Africa.10 Over $9
billion has been poured by the international community into the DR Congo
to pick up the pieces left in the wake of the Congo Conflict.11
Part I of this Article surveys the regulatory framework in which arms
transfers and military assistance occur.12 Part II provides a historical background of the DR Congo, and summarizes and examines U.S. military aid
and sales to the DR Congo since its independence from Belgium.13 Part III
examines the consequences of military aid on the DR Congo and argues
that the same analysis applies to other developing countries.14 Parts II and
III illustrate the inconsistencies and ineffectiveness of the U.S. arms export
control regime.15 Finally, Part IV recommends a framework for reform of
the arms export control regime to reconcile it with U.S. foreign policy and
national security interests.16

8. Mobutu Sese Seko’s birth name was Joseph-Desire Mobutu. He changed his name in a
populist move to promote Africanization. Mobutu Dies in Exile in Morocco: Ruled Zaire with
Iron Grip for 3 Decades, CNN, Sept. 7, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9709/07/
mobutu.wrap/.
9. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE:
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (2008) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTE], http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm.
10. JOHN PRENDERGAST & DAVID SMOCK, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, PUTTING HUMPTY
DUMPTY TOGETHER: RECONSTRUCTING PEACE IN THE CONGO 2 (1999), available at http://
www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990831.pdf.
11. MONUC, Budget, http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=11533&menuOpened=
About%20MONUC. The operational budget for MONUC from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008 was
$1,115.65 million. Democratic Republic of the Congo—MONUC—Facts and Figures, http://
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html [hereinafter MONUC—Facts and Figures].
MONUC has been operating in the DR Congo since 1999 with a comparable budget each year.
Id. See also UN Mission in the Dem. Rep. of the Congo [MONUC], MONUC and the Elections:
DR 2006 Elections, 1 (July 2006), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/
elec.pdf [hereinafter MONUC and the Elections] (detailing the MONUC cost to date and the
budgetary breakdown). The United States funds 26.7% of all UN peacekeeping operations, and
therefore has spent over $2.4 billion to fund MONUC. Id.
12. Infra Part I.
13. Infra Part II.
14. Infra Part III.
15. Infra Parts II & III.
16. Infra Part IV.
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II. THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFER
SCHEMA
The Congo Conflict is not a machete massacre.17 Millions of SA/LW
units and conventional weaponry continue to wreak havoc within DR
Congo’s borders.18 The United States provided several forms of military
assistance to the DR Congo before the Congo Conflict.19 Military assistance, given to DR Congo and other developing countries is governed by
the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).20 Forms of military assistance include
International Military Education and Training (IMET)21 and the provision
of Excess Defense Articles (EDA).22
Congress has codified parameters for the provision of IMET.23 The
President may provide IMET to military and related civilian personnel of
friendly foreign countries.24 IMET training and education is largely provided via foreign military members’ attendance at U.S. operated military
facilities.25 Congress’ ostensible purpose in providing IMET is to encourage beneficial relations and understanding between the United States and
foreign countries, to further international peace and security,26 to improve
the ability of foreign countries to utilize their resources and become selfreliant,27 and to increase recipient countries’ awareness of human rights.28
In 2002, Congress imposed a requirement that the Secretary of State track
IMET participants’ human rights records.29
17. Although the major parties signed the Lusaka Accords in 2002, which were hailed as the
end to the Congo Conflict, large scale battles continue to occur in Eastern DR Congo. See, e.g.,
Press Release MONUC, Katanga: Armed Confrontations Between FARDC Troops in Kamina
Brassage Centre (Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=16721 (informing
that armed confrontations occurred in Southeastern DRC). Ostensibly, the Goma Accords, signed
in January 2008, were to bring a halt to continued conflict in Eastern DR Congo. BACKGROUND
NOTE, supra note 9. Although the Goma Accord is arguably a means to “reestablish lasting peace
and stability in the Great Lakes region,” recent fighting in Eastern DR Congo indicates that the
Goma accords are of limited significance. Id. See also New Fighting Stops DR Congo Aid, BBC
NEWS, Apr. 25, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7366477.stm (discussing
renewed conflict in eastern DR Congo after the Goma Accord took effect).
18. IRIN IN-DEPTH, GUNS OUT OF CONTROL: THE CONTINUING THREAT OF SMALL ARMS
19 (2006), http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/in-depth/Small-Arms-IRIN-In-Depth.pdf.
19. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1998: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO,
HUMAN RIGHTS DEVS., http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Africa-04.htm.
20. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151 (West 2008).
21. Id. § 2347.
22. Id. § 2321j.
23. Id. § 2347.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 2347(1)-(3).
26. Id. § 2347b(1).
27. Id. § 2347b(2).
28. Id. § 2347b(3).
29. Id. § 2347h(a).
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Congress has also placed restrictions on presidential discretion in the
provision of EDA.30 The President may transfer EDA if such transfers are
proposed to Congress in one of three ways.31 First, the President may justify the transfer in his or her annual congressional presentation documents for
military assistance programs (Presidential Justifications).32 Second, he or
she may show that the transfer falls under another permissible provision of
the FAA.33 Third, if the President did not justify the transfer in his or her
annual Justifications, he or she may separately authorize it within the same
calendar year of the desired transfer.34 The President’s Justifications must
explain the purposes of the transfer, its value, and whether the transfer was
on a grant or sale basis.35
The President is limited to EDA transfers which are drawn from existing Department of Defense stocks,36 and which do not require Department
of Defense funds for shipping.37 The President’s Justifications must show
that the transfer will not affect U.S. military preparedness,38 that the foreign
policy benefits of a sale as opposed to a grant have been weighed,39 and that
the sale will not adversely affect U.S. business interests.40 The President is
required to notify Congress thirty days in advance of a transfer in excess of
$7 million or of a designated defense article.41 Cumulative transfers may
not exceed $425 million annually.42
EDA transfers or an IMET allotment made on grant basis for over $3
million requires the President to find that the recipient country complies
with the United Nations Charter and that the recipient will only use the
defense articles for self-defense.43 In addition to the Presidential Justifications, each year the Department of State submits Budget Justifications for

30. Id. § 2321j.
31. Id. § 2321j(a).
32. Id.
33. Id. Specifically, the President may show that the transfer is pursuant to Part VIII of Subchapter I of Chapter 32. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 2321j(h).
36. Id. § 2321j(b)(1)(A).
37. Id. § 2321j(b)(1)(B).
38. Id. § 2321j(b)(1)(C).
39. Id. § 2321j(b)(1)(D)
40. Id. § 2321j(b)(1)(E).
41. Id. § 2321j(f)(1).
42. Id. § 2321j(g)(1).
43. Id. § 2314(b)(1)-(2).
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the next fiscal year to fund EDA and IMET programs on a country-bycountry, program-by-program basis.44
Military assistance, however, is merely one piece in the large mosaic of
arms transfers. In the private sphere, U.S. weapons manufacturers considerably outsell their competitors. Private sales to the DR Congo during the
Cold War and afterwards were commonplace.45 Private sales are governed
by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).46 By Executive Order No.
11958,47 the President delegated authority to enforce private arms sales regulations under the AECA to the Secretary of State.48 The State Department
issued the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to implement
this authority.49
Pursuant to the AECA, the President must provide Congress with a
classified report of all sales eligible for approval during the calendar year
greater than $7 million.50 Similar to FAA requirements, the President must
provide additional information to Congress if so requested.51 Under the
AECA, the President is required to notify Congress of any offer to sell more
than $25 million in defense goods or services to a foreign client.52 Congress may block the proposed sale by a joint resolution disapproving the
sale, which is subject to a presidential veto.53
The AECA further provides that defense articles and services on the
President’s United States Munitions List (Munitions List)54 are subject to
registration and licensing requirements.55 The Munitions List has twentyone categories, which range from items solely for military use to items that

44. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR
FOREIGN OPERATIONS (2007), http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/ [hereinafter 2007 BUDGET
JUSTIFICATIONS] (providing a program-by-program, region-by-region, and country-by-country
breakdown of the proposed foreign operation budget for 2007).
45. See WILLIAM HARTUNG & BRIDGET MOIX, ARMS TRADE RES. CTR., DEADLY LEGACY:
U.S. ARMS TO AFRICA AND THE CONGO WAR (2000), http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/
reports/congo.htm (providing an analysis of U.S. involvement in DR Congo).
46. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (West 2008).
47. Exec. Ord. No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4,311 (Jan. 18, 1977), reprinted as amended in 22
U.S.C.A. § 2751 (2008), 1977 WL 201870.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see 22 C.F.R. pt. 129 (2007) (noting that the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
(DDTC) administers the ITAR).
50. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2765(a)-(c).
51. Id. § 2776(b)(1)(A)-(P).
52. Id.
53. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1266 (1988) (detailing flaws in the foreign
policy decision making process and chronicling the ascendancy of the executive branch in the
area).
54. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(a).
55. Id. § 2778(b).
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have civil application.56 The AECA targets private individuals engaged in
the manufacture, export, import, or the brokering of items on the Munitions
List.57 Individuals who willfully violate the AECA may be subject to
criminal penalties.58 The AECA and ITAR do not apply extraterritorially.59
Despite substantial regulation, criticism has been levied at the State
Department’s export licensing procedures, which often involve lost applications, inconsistent licensing decisions, and processing delays.60 The U.S.
system of dual jurisdiction between the State Department and the Commerce Department has likewise been ridiculed.61
Although arms assistance and SA/LW sales and transfers are highly
regulated, loopholes exist. The Department of Defense engages in largely
unmonitored Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET).62 The JCET programs are similar to IMET in that military personnel from other countries
participate in military training.63 The JCET programs do not, however,
have the same level of congressional oversight as IMET programs, nor do
they require similar Presidential Justifications.64 JCET programs have recently come under considerable scrutiny.65 In 1999, a General Accounting
Office Report to Congress found that the Department of Defense had not
accurately accounted for the number of JCET programs or their costs.66 To

56. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2007).
57. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(1).
58. Id. § 2778(c).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Yakou, 428 F.3d 241, 252-54 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding that it
was Congress’ intent in promulgating the AECA that it would only apply to U.S. persons even
though foreign brokers outside of the United States could be involved in activities affecting the
United States).
60. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXPORT CONTROLS: REENGINEERING
BUSINESS PROCESSES CAN IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OF STATE DEPARTMENT LICENSE REVIEWS 611 (Dec. 31, 2001) (highlighting the overly burdensome nature of the State Department’s export
licensing procedures).
61. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-02-120, EXPORT CONTROLS:
CLARIFICATION OF JURISDICTION FOR MISSILE TECHNOLOGY ITEMS NEEDED 7-11 (Oct. 9, 2001).
62. 10 U.S.C. § 2011 (2000).
63. See, e.g., id. § 2011(a) (discussing the authority to pay training expenses with friendly
foreign forces).
64. Compare id. § 2011 (requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress
specifying the recipient countries, training and benefits flowing from the provision of JCET
funding for each fiscal year) with 22 U.S.C.A. § 2347 (West 2008). Congress clearly indicated
which type of programs it prefers the President to fund, placed limitations to which countries’
assistance may be provided, required the Secretary of Defense to submit human rights reports
regarding recipient countries, and required Presidential Justifications. Id.
65. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY TRAINING: MANAGEMENT
AND OVERSIGHT OF JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING 7, 32-40 (1999), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99173.pdf (finding that the Department of Defense has not
made accurate reports to Congress regarding JCET operations).
66. International Military Training Transparency and Accountability Act, H.R. 1063, 106th
Cong. (1999).
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correct the problem the International Military Training Transparency and
Accountability Act (Transparency and Accountability Act) was introduced
the same year.67 The Transparency and Accountability Act would essentially close the JCET loophole and prohibit all forms of military training
and services to countries that are ineligible for IMET.68 The Transparency
and Accountability Act was referred to the House International Relations
Committee where it has languished for almost eight years.69
Where Congress took action, for example, on sales to sub-Saharan
African countries, oversight has been lax.70 Sales to countries who participated in the Congo Conflict may be viewed in light of 22 U.S.C. § 2773.71
Section 2773 states Congress’ preference against selling military articles
and defense services to Sub-Saharan Africa.72 Section 2773 does not bind
the President; rather it puts him or her on notice that Congress may bind
him or her at a later date if he or she does not act consistently with Congress’ preferences.73 Despite Congress’ preference against arms transfers to
Sub-Saharan Africa, U.S. manufactured arms continued to pour across
borders throughout the Congo Conflict, as well as the civil wars in Liberia,
Angola, and Sierra Leone.74 The abundance of U.S. manufactured and supplied arms in conflict zones was largely the result of applicants indicating
the arms were for end-user sales, which would pass muster under ITAR. 75
These applicants later sold the articles to countries or groups under embargos.76 In 1996, Congress recognized the difficulties presented by end-user

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See THOMAS Home, The Library of Congress, H.R. 1063, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d106:HR01063:@@@C (indicating the latest action for H.R. 1063).
70. 22 U.S.C.A § 2773 (West 2008). Section 2773 provides:
It is the sense of the Congress that the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa are primarily
those of economic development and that United States policy should assist in limiting
the development of costly military conflict in that region. Therefore, the President
shall exercise restraint in selling defense articles and defense services, and in
providing financing for sales of defense articles and defense services, to countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Kevin Sheehan, Executive-Legislative Relations and the U.S. Arms Export Control
Regime in the Post-Cold War Era, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 179, 189-90 (1995).
74. HARTUNG & MOIX, supra note 45. See BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ARMS AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (July 1, 2001), http://www.state.gov/s/
inr/rls/fs/2001/4004.htm (indicating that weapons continued to pour into Sub-Saharan Africa
despite arms embargos).
75. End Users Worry Arms Critics, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003, http://
washingtontimes.com/news/2003/nov/29/20031129-115544-1905r/.
76. Id.
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sales to parties under an embargo by amending Section 2785 of the
AECA.77 The amendment requires the Department of Defense to monitor
end-user sales with the objective of providing “reasonable assurances
that . . . the recipient is complying with the requirements imposed . . . with
respect to the use, transfers, and security of defense articles and defense
services.”78 The end-use monitoring program has been deemed critical for
maintaining physical accountability and security for weapons.79 The
program, however, has had only limited success, as sales are still permitted
to end-users in developing countries that abut conflict zones.80
Other attempts for reform have similarly been unsuccessful. In 1999,
the McKinney-Rohrabacher Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers (Code of
Conduct) was introduced.81 Essentially, the Code of Conduct requires
presidential certification to Congress that the recipient country of U.S.
military assistance and arms transfers is democratic, respects human rights,
is not engaged in acts of armed aggression, and fully participates in the UN
register of conventional arms.82 Like the Transparency and Accountability
Act, the Code of Conduct died quietly and has awaited an Executive
Comment since 1999.83
An example of the present inconsistencies in U.S. policy regarding
military assistance and arms transfers are the Cameroon provisions. In
2006, the United States provided $236,000 in foreign military assistance to
Cameroon.84 In the 2007 Budget Justifications,85 the State Department
acknowledged that Cameroon’s “democratic institutions are weak, corruption remains a real problem, and human rights abuses by Cameroon’s police
and gendarmes forces are a concern.”86 According to the 2007 Budget
Justifications, IMET funds were to be used “for professional military development courses stressing resource management, [and] civilian-military
relations.”87 The 2007 Budget Justifications also highlight Cameroon’s

77. Defense and Security Assistance Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-164, § 40A, 110
Stat 1421, 1436-37.
78. Id.
79. 2007 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 44, at 227.
80. DR Congo Arms Embargo ‘Failing,’ BBC NEWS, Oct. 16, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/6055864.stm.
81. Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act of 1999, H.R. 2269, 106th Cong. (1999).
82. Id. § 3(a).
83. See THOMAS Home, The Library of Congress, H.R. 2269, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d106:HR02269:@@@X (noting the actions for H.R. 2269).
84. 2007 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 44, at 263. This amount is a decrease from
the FY 2004, where $361,000 was spent on IMET to Cameroon. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.

2008]

GREED, GUNS & GRIST

391

eligibility to receive EDA on a grant basis pursuant Section 516 of the
FAA.88 The 2007 Budget Justifications state that the material would be
used by the government of Cameroon for internal security, counter-narcotic
activities, peacekeeping deployments, and military modernization efforts.89
The Human Rights Country Report for Cameroon, also published by
the State Department, highlights several human rights violations.90 Violations by Cameroon’s security forces include “numerous unlawful killings
by security forces[,] regular torture, beatings, and other abuses of persons . . . by security forces[,] impunity among the security forces[,] severe
limits on citizens’ ability to change their government[,] restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association.”91 Yet the 2007 Budget
Justifications noted that “Cameroon is a stable country in which the government has been effective in managing ethnic and linguistic diversity.”92 A
possible explanation for the inconsistencies between the Country Report
and the Budget Justifications is a possible bureaucratic wall within the State
Department.93
The present loopholes and proscribed nature of the FAA and AECA
and implementing procedures promulgated by the State Department reflect
the need to correct problems arising from the provision of military assistance and unregulated arms sales to developing countries. Examining the
disastrous effect that the combination of weapons sales, military assistance,
cold war tensions, and corrupt politics had in DR Congo, evidences a
compelling need for further revision of the FAA and AECA.
III. CASE ON POINT: THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
They were no colonists; their administration was merely a squeeze,
and nothing more, I suspect. They were conquerors, and for that
you want only brute force—nothing to boast of, when you have it,
since your strength is just an accident arising from the weaknesses
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CAMEROON (2006), http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61558.htm.
91. Id.
92. 2007 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 44, at 263.
93. This is a problem that human rights groups have tried to address. Human Rights Watch
highlighted the inconsistencies in the State Department’s Country Report on the Philippines and
the 2001-2002 State Department estimate on military aid to be provided to the Philippines. The
Country Report listed numerous and serious human rights violations while the budget estimate
listed 30,000 M16 rifles which were to be provided to the Philippine government. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE NEED FOR GLOBAL ACTION (2003),
http://hrw.org/background/arms/small-arms-070703-03.htm.
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of others. They grabbed what they could get for the sake of what
was to be got. It was just robbery with violence, aggravated
murder on a great scale, and men going at it blind—as is very
proper for those who tackle darkness.94
The scramble for Africa began with King Leopold’s fabulous piece of
cake: the Belgian Congo. In the 125 years since its boundaries were artificially demarcated, DR Congo has experienced independence, two coups de
état, several civil wars, assassinations, and the despoliation of its resources.95 The scramble for DR Congo continues largely unabated.96 Since
the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1960 the United States has played
an integral role in the development of DR Congo.97 The United States
provided military assistance to Mobutu throughout his tenure as one of
Africa’s most infamous dictators.98 Foreign aid flowed freely into DR
Congo despite brutal repression, failed and corrupt parastatals, and downright banditry amongst the upper echelons of government.99 It took the
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the contemporaneous thawing of the
Cold War for foreign aid to the DR Congo to significantly diminish.100
Unable to hold the reins of government without large U.S. aid packages,
Mobutu was overthrown in 1996.101 Mobutu’s ousting came at a high
price: over six years of conflict and more than five million deaths.102
A. THE DR CONGO BEFORE MAJOR WESTERN INVOLVEMENT
The U.S. subsidized influx of weapons was nothing novel to DR
Congo. Henry Morton Stanley, explorer extraordinaire to DR Congo,
brought with him a powerful private army equipped with a thousand rapid

94. JOSEPH CONRAD, THE HEART OF DARKNESS AND SELECTED SHORT FICTION 50 (Barnes
& Noble Classics 2003) (1902).
95. DR Congo had its first democratic election in July 2006. Observers Praise DR Congo’s
Poll, BBC NEWS, Oct. 31, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6101538.stm. A run-off vote
for president went relatively smoothly on October 30, 2006. Id. A U.S. observer stated that the
poll was “light years ahead of anything” the DR Congo had previously seen. Id.
96. UN Troops ‘Armed DR Congo Rebels,’ BBC NEWS, Apr. 28, 2008, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7365283.stm.
97. HARTUNG & MOIX, supra note 45.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Jim Bitterman, Zaire’s Absent, Ailing Leader Says He’s Ready to Fight Back, CNN,
Nov. 20, 1996, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9611/20/zaire.mobutu/index.html.
102. BENJAMIN COGHLAN ET AL., INT’L RESCUE COMM., MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO: AN ONGOING CRISIS ii (2007), http://www.theirc.org/resources/2007/20067_congomortalitysurvey.pdf.
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fire rifles, a dozen small Krupp canons, and four machine guns.103 Morton
Stanley’s armament was only a precursor to DR Congo’s colonial era,
which was epitomized by the conscription of Congolese into the laborintensive rubber and ivory export industries. The Belgian experience in DR
Congo stands apart from other European countries’ experiences in Africa
due to its brutality and complete control over the indigenous population.104
From 1878 to 1960, DR Congo’s colonial period, all government entities
were in strictly Belgian hands.105 The transition of DR Congo from a
Belgian colony to an independent country was abrupt and chaotic. In
January 1960, Congolese political leaders and the Belgian government
agreed upon a date for independence a mere six months later: June 30,
1960.106 Two political parties vied for power during the run-up to the
official transition date: the Association des Bakongo (ABAKO), an ethnic
political party supporting the unification of the Bakongo people lead by
Joseph Kasa-Vubu (Kasa-Vubu); and the Congolese National Movement
(MNC), a nationalist party lead by Patrice Lumumba (Lumumba).107
To effectively form a government, the two parties agreed to share
power, with Kasa-Vubu as President and Lumumba as Prime Minister.108
Kasa-Vubu was a moderate and was generally conciliatory towards
Belgium.109 Lumumba’s feelings toward the former colonial power were
made clear during a dinner celebrating DR Congo’s independence on June
30, 1960.110 At the dinner, Belgium’s King Baudouin remarked that “[t]he
independence of the Congo . . . constitutes the culmination of the work conceived by the genius of King Leopold II.”111 In response, Lumumba frantically scribbled notes in preparation for his speech. He replied to King
Baudouin:
We have seen our lands despoiled under the terms of what was
supposedly the law of the land but which only recognized the right
of the strongest. . . . We have seen the terrible suffering of those
103. ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND
HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 84 (Houghton Mifflin 1998).
104. Id. at 158.
105. MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA: FROM THE HOPES OF FREEDOM TO THE
HEART OF DESPAIR 93-94 (2005). In 1878 King Leopold enlisted Henry Morton Stanley to carve
out territory for him along the Congo River. Id. at 94-95. After King Leopold was forced to turn
the territory over to the government of Belgium the military officers were strictly Belgian. Id. at
96.
106. Id. at 100.
107. Id. at 98.
108. Id. at 102.
109. Id. at 101.
110. Id. at 93.
111. Id.
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banished to remote regions because of their political opinions or
religious beliefs, exiled within their own country, their fate truly
worse than death itself. . . . And finally, who can forget the
volleys of gunfire in which so many of our brothers perished, the
cells where the authorities threw those who would not submit to a
rule where justice meant oppression and exploitation.112
Days after independence, the army, still under the heel of Belgian
military commanders, rebelled against the nascent government.113 Belgium
quickly offered to restore order.114 Lumumba flatly rejected Belgium’s
offer but was unable to quell the rebellion.115 The crisis further escalated
when Katangan leader Moise Tshombe (Tshombe), prompted by Belgian
mining interests and the Belgian government, withdrew the Katanga
province from DR Congo.116 Belgium, fearing for the viability of its former
colony, unilaterally sent in its forces to restore order.117 Lumumba declared
Belgium’s deployment an act of war.118
Lumumba turned to the United Nations to bring the Katanga province
back into DR Congo and restore order.119 When the United Nations did not
satisfy Lumumba’s requests, he asked the Soviet Union for logistical assistance.120 As a result of Lumumba’s request to the Soviet Union, DR Congo
became embroiled in the Cold War.121
Reacting to Lumumba’s bold moves, Belgium urged Kasa-Vubu to
dismiss Lumumba.122 Kasa-Vubu was receptive to Belgian interests and
dismissed Lumumba on September 5, 1960.123 In response, Lumumba

112. Id. at 94.
113. Id. at 102.
114. Id. at 103.
115. Id.
116. The Heart of Darkness, TIME, Dec. 22, 1961, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,827134,00.html [hereinafter The Heart of Darkness]. Katanga is a region in South
East Congo which is of strategic importance due to its vast mineral wealth. Scramble for DR
Congo’s Mineral Wealth, BBC NEWS, Apr. 17, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
4900734.stm.
117. The Heart of Darkness, supra note 116.
118. The Bear’s Teeth, TIME, Feb. 24, 1961, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,828769,00.html.
119. TYRONE SAVAGE, The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Inchoate Transition,
Interlocking Conflicts, in THROUGH FIRE WITH WATER 139 (Eric Doxtader & Charles VillaVicencio eds., Africa World Press 2003).
120. Id. at 140.
121. Id. Lumumba’s invitation to the Soviet Union was seen as a decisive moment. Id. At
the time U.S. foreign policy centered on the so-called “Domino Theory,” where if one country fell
to communism others would also in quick succession. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 141.
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dismissed Kasa-Vubu.124 The result was a constitutional impasse that
paved the way for Mobutu. On September 14, 1960 Mobutu announced
that the army, with the help of the caretaker government, would henceforth
rule the country.125 Subsequently, Mobutu worked out a deal with KasaVubu, wherein Mobutu would cede the country back to Kasa-Vubu in
exchange for a larger role in government.126 The United Nations recognized the deal as legitimate.127 Lumumba was consigned to be a prisoner in
his own home, defrocked of his title of Prime Minister, and in fear for his
life.128
The Katangan succession, Belgian involvement, and the invitation by
Lumumba to the Soviet Union, provoked the United States to enter the fray.
The Congo Crisis was the first time the United States became significantly
involved in African affairs.129 The U.S. involvement in the Congo Crisis
included racist senators, air-force support for UN Blue Helmets, and
citizens who formed the Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom
Fighters.130
The combination of Cold War tensions, internal disagreement between
ABAKO and the MNC, and foreign interests in DR Congo, all lead to
Lumumba’s downfall. Unfortunately, Lumumba did not heed the ominous
signs. On or about January 17, 1961, Lumumba was murdered with the
complicity of Mobutu, the government of Belgium, and perhaps the United
States.131 He was captured as he tried to escape from house arrest in the
former governor’s mansion.132 He was flown to Katanga and executed by a
firing squad.133 It took forty-one years for Belgium to acknowledge its
complicity in his murder.134 The United States has yet to formally do so.

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 140-41.
127. See BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 9 (stating that a peacekeeping force of the UN was
used to restore order).
128. SAVAGE, supra note 119, at 141.
129. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE AND UNITY 24546 (2005).
130. The Heart of Darkness, supra note 116.
131. SAVAGE, supra note 119, at 142. We will probably never know the exact date of his
murder. See Lumumba Apology: Congo’s Mixed Feelings, BBC NEWS, Feb. 6, 2002, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1805546.stm (reporting the Congolese response to Belgium’s apology
for their responsibility in Lumumba’s death); Madeleine Kalb, The C.I.A. and Lumumba, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1981, at 32 (exploring the role of the CIA in DR Congo and specifically the death
of Lumumba).
132. SAVAGE, supra note 119, at 141.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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B. HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS SALES TO
DR CONGO
After Lumumba’s death, Kasa-Vubu had a tenuous hold on the reins of
government. The Katangan secessionists still presented a problem to effective governance. In July 1964, Kasa-Vubu brought the Katangan secessionist leader, Tshombe out of retirement.135 Tshombe’s appointment as Prime
Minister in a coalition government was Kasa-Vubu’s final attempt to stave
off his government’s implosion.136 Lumumba’s supporters, known as
Muleists, viewed this as an attack on their political ideology and revolted
with the goal of seizing power in Kinshasa.137
Western powers came to the aid of Kasa-Vubu, who they viewed as
their pro-Western ally. The United States provided logistical support for a
ragtag group of government forces, foreign mercenaries, and Belgian paratroopers.138 The support helped suppress the Muleists and pushed them
back to a contained area in Eastern DR Congo.139 As a result, DR Congo
was left with an unpopular, unelected government propped up not by the
will of its people, but by the grace of foreign powers.140
Tshmobe quickly became dissatisfied with his role as Prime Minister
and sought to enlarge his power.141 Kasa-Vubu preferred to retain as much
power for himself as possible, and accordingly, dismissed Tshombe.142
This constitutional impasse had been played out before. The result was the
same: On November 25, 1965, two years after the United States began
providing aid to the Congolese military,143 Mobutu seized power.144 This
time he took the reins with no intention of giving them up.

135. Id. at 140.
136. Id. at 143.
137. Id. at 119; Lumumba Apology, supra note 131. The insurrectionists were called
Mulelists and were based out of Lumumba’s home district around Kisangani (then Stanleyville).
Id.
138. Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at 29. Congo’s troops
were a mix of Katangan gendarmes, European mercenaries, and the remnants of the untrained
Congolese army. Id. Despite the prohibition on the use of mercenaries by the Geneva Convention
in 1949, they have routinely played a role in African conflicts. Id.
139. Ernesto “Che” Guevara worked with the East Congolese rebels briefly in their fight
against the Kinshasa government led by Kasa-Vubu. MEREDITH, supra note 105, at 149.
140. PAUL NUGENT, AFRICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 88-89 (2004).
141. Id. at 89.
142. Id.
143. See The Nat’l Archives, U.S. National Archives Report on FAA, http://aad.archives.
gov/aad/fielded-search.jsp?dt=822&cat=SB137&tf=F&bc=sb,sl; (follow country code CX for list
of documents regarding military assistance from the United States to the Congo) (detailing the
weapons assistance and military training assistance the United States provided to the Congolese
military in 1965).
144. MEREDITH, supra note 105, at 115.
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Mobutu’s rise to power was inextricably linked to U.S. support. United
States military assistance to DR Congo began in 1963, less than two years
after Lumumba was assassinated and while the country was in a power
dispute.145 All assistance went straight to DR Congo’s military.146 Since
Mobutu was the commander-in-chief of the military forces, the United
States provided aid to the branch of the Congolese government that had
already seized power from those democratically elected.
United States military assistance to DR Congo initially was in grant
form.147 The policy of American administrations, however, soon shifted to
a preference for arms sales.148 In 1973 the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee called on the State Department to “get . . . arms sales business
back to free enterprise where they belong.”149 Thus, while military
assistance grants to DR Congo (and other developing countries) stagnated
between the late 1960s and 1970s, arms sales rose from approximately $100
million in 1966 to $3.5 billion in 1978.150 However, the focus on weapons
sales was short-lived. By the 1980s, few recipient developing countries,
including DR Congo, could afford to pay for the weaponry due to massive
indebtedness.151 Within twenty years, arms transfers had come full circle
back to military assistance grants.152
Arms transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa during this period reflected
worldwide trends. In 1974 military assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa was at
a low of $40 million.153 This figure dramatically increased during the
Second Cold War, from 1982 to 1985.154 During the Second Cold War,
more than $310 million in military aid were given to developing countries.155 Further, U.S. policy was to encourage Western suppliers to provide
arms through sales on favorable terms.156 Thus, while the United States
145. The Nat’l Archives, supra note 143.
146. Id.
147. R.D. MCKINLAY & A. MUGHAN, AID AND ARMS TO THE THIRD WORLD: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRIBUTION AND IMPACT OF U.S. OFFICIAL TRANSFERS 59 (St. Martin’s
Press 1984).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 60.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See generally Rune Skarstein, Cold War: An Aberration or the Normality of
Contemporary International Politics?, 22 J. PEACE RES. 175, 177-80 (1985) (classifying the
amount of U.S. aid to developing countries during periods of Détente as an anomaly during the
Cold War). The Second Cold War lasted from 1982 to 1985. Id.
155. The Nat’l Archives, supra note 143.
156. DEMILITARIZING THE MIND: AFRICAN AGENDAS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY 92 (Alex
de Waal, ed., Africa World Press 2002).
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provided a significant amount of assistance over a period of a mere three
years, it was only one player amongst many transferring arms to DR
Congo.157
Throughout his tenure as Africa’s most notorious dictator, the United
States provided Mobutu with more than $300 million in weapons and $100
million in military training.158 It is also possible that the United States
covertly transferred arms via clandestine Central Intelligence Agency
operations in DR Congo.159 Throughout this period the DR Congo received
the most U.S. foreign aid out of all Sub-Saharan African countries, such aid
outliving several U.S. administrations.160 The United States viewed
Mobutu as an ally in the Cold War and thus turned a blind eye to his
pilfering of the economy and other character flaws.161
For more than thirty years Mobutu ruled DR Congo.162 “Mobutu’s rule
was based on bonds of personal loyalty between himself and his
cohorts.”163 Throughout Mobutu’s reign, a once poor uneducated boy from
the backwaters somehow netted $6 billion.164 Each time Mobutu’s power
was seriously threatened, Western countries came to his aid.165 President
George H. W. Bush at one time went so far as to extol Mobutu as “one of
our most valued friends.”166 When justifying the transfer of EDA to DR
Congo, he declared “that the furnishing, sale and/or lease of defense articles
and services to the Government of Congo will strengthen the security of the
United States and promote world peace.”167 Such support enabled Mobutu
to oppress political opponents and thus hampered the development of
democracy and the rule of law within DR Congo.
157. Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, BBC NEWS, Apr. 30, 2008, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072684.stm.
158. The Nat’l Archives, supra note 143.
159. Id.
160. GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, AFRICA UNCHAINED: THE BLUEPRINT FOR AFRICA’S FUTURE
213 (2005).
161. MCKINLAY & MUGHAN, supra note 147, at 59.
162. See generally Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 157 (detailing
significant events leading up to and major developments in the Congo Crisis).
163. SAVAGE, supra note 119, at 141.
164. Alan Cowell, Mobutu’s Zaire: Magic and Decay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, at 31.
Compare with $110, the amount an average Congolese earns per year. See The World Bank
Group, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/report.do?method=showReport (providing statistics on DR Congo’s economic profile). It would take 54,545,455 years for one of Mobutu’s
former citizens to earn as much as he had amassed. Mobutu was not ashamed of his pilfering: he
proudly admitted on a CBS program in 1984 that he was the second richest man in the world.
AYITTEY, supra note 160, at 213.
165. Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 157. For example, in 1977,
France and Belgium aided him in thwarting an attack by rebels based out of Angola. Id.
166. HOCHSHILD, supra note 103, at 303.
167. Presidential Determination No. 91-49, 56 Fed. Reg. 46,977 (Aug. 24, 1991).
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C. TIMES CHANGE
Due to its mineral wealth, size, and location, DR Congo was able to use
Cold War tensions to secure aid from the West.168 At the end of the Cold
War, as the amount of U.S. military assistance decreased, Mobutu’s grip on
power in the DR Congo ebbed.169 After the end of the Cold War, the
United States grew tired of propping up a dictator and kleptocrat.170 The
United States presented Mobutu with an ultimatum: either allow for multiparty politics, or be prepared to face an existence devoid of U.S. aid.171
Feeling the tightening of the purse strings, Mobutu allowed other parties to
form and appointed a transition government in 1990.172 Within days of
allowing political pluralism, over 400 political parties sprang up.173
Mobutu quickly saw that he had little political support. He retracted
his authorization of political pluralism, declared political parties illegal and
prohibited them from assembling.174 Shortly thereafter, approximately
seventy-five students were killed protesting Mobutu’s latest about-face.175
Mobutu remained imperturbable and refused to open an internal inquiry
into the matter.176 As a result, countries that were once Mobutu’s biggest
donors turned to publicly criticize him.177
During the impasse Mobutu forgot to pay the soldiers, and in 1991 they
rebelled in Kinshasa.178 The rebellion forced Mobutu to agree to a coalition
government with opposition leaders, the Sovereign National Conference
(SNC), which was intended to serve as a transitional government.179 The
SNC gave itself a legislative mandate and elected Etienne Tshisekedi as
Prime Minister.180 Sharing power, however, was not an acceptable outcome

168. SAVAGE, supra note 119, at 141.
169. HARTUNG & MOIX, supra note 45. Although U.S. military assistance and arms sales
decreased after the end of the Cold War, they did not cease. Id. From 1989-1998 foreign military
sales to DR Congo totaled approximately $15,151,000. Id. Commercial sales amounted to approximately $218,000. Id. The United States also provided IMET during this period in the
amount of $1,229,000. Id.
170. The noun kleptocrat is derived from “kleptocracy” which is defined as a “government
characterized by rampant greed and corruption.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2003), available at http://www.bartleby.com/61/38/k0083800.html.
171. MEREDITH, supra note 105, at 393.
172. Time Line of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supra note 157.
173. SAVAGE, supra note 119, at 143.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. MEREDITH, supra note 105, at 393.
178. Id. at 391.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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for Mobutu. In response Mobutu created his own government.181 The yearlong stalemate between the SNC/Tshisekedi and Mobutu ended with an
agreement to merge the two factions and hold an election within two
years.182 The election did not occur. Mobutu subverted a transition to
democracy by using his control over the armed forces to obstruct SNC
government functions, intimidate opposition leaders, promote anarchy and
chaos, and incite violence. 183
The death knell for Mobutu did not come from internal troubles;
instead it was the result of the instability of a neighbor, Rwanda. In 1994
the majority Hutu population systematically exterminated the minority
Tutsi population.184 At the end of the genocide over 800,000 Tutsis and
their Hutu sympathizers lay dead throughout Rwanda.185 Hutu militias,
known as the Interahamwe,186 had fled to massive refugee camps in Eastern
DR Congo after the Tutsis took control of the Rwandan government.187
The Interahamwe used Eastern DR Congo as a base for attacks against their
perceived enemies in Rwanda.188 The newly installed Tutsi government in
Rwanda, headed by President Paul Kagame, soon tired of constantly
combating the Interahamwe.189 President Kagame, upset that Mobutu
would not oust the rebels from Eastern DR Congo, joined forces with
Uganda’s President, Yoweri Museveni.190 President Museveni saw the
strategic benefit of having a self-installed ally in the DR Congo.191 On
October 8, 1996, Congolese rebel, Rwandan, and Ugandan forces
attacked.192 They were headed by a Congolese face, Laurent Kabila, and
shared a common goal: the ouster of Mobutu.193

181. Id. at 392.
182. Time Line of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supra note 157.
183. SAVAGE, supra note 119, at 142.
184. See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 6 (1998) (“[E]veryone in the country’s Hutu majority group was
called upon to murder everyone in the Tutsi minority.”).
185. Id.
186. Translated from Kinrwanda, in an interview with Rwandan refugees in Kenya,
Interahamwe means those who attack together.
187. GOUREVITCH, supra note 184, at 269-72. Ironically, the international community spent
more on aid for the Hutu genocidiers than on their Tutsi victims. Id.
188. Id.
189. MEREDITH, supra note 105, at 530-31.
190. Id. at 531.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 531-32.
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D. THE FALL OF MOBUTU AND THE MILITARIZATION OF DR CONGO
Mobutu, weakened by a drop in U.S. funding, could not suppress the
invading forces and fled after a year of warfare and failed peace talks.194
Kabila swiftly moved into Kinshasa and consolidated power.195 The United
States quickly thereafter offered military support to the new government.196
The change in government did not lend stability to DR Congo. Laurent
Kabila soon tired of his Rwandan and Ugandan benefactors and attempted
to sever relations.197 Rwanda and Uganda reacted by reinvading DR
Congo.198 Kabila, unable to rebuff their forces alone, called upon a
different set of neighbors for assistance: Angola, Zimbabwe, and
Namibia.199 By 2000, Rwanda and Uganda occupied the Eastern half of the
country while Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia ruled the Western half.200
The result was one of the deadliest wars in African history.201
The states that de facto partitioned DR Congo were also beneficiaries
of arms transfers.202 From 1989 to 1998, commercial arms sales to Angola
were $31,000; Namibia $4,245,000; Rwanda $324,000; Uganda
$11,420,000; Zimbabwe $1,395,000.203 Furthermore, all of the foreign
troops had received training via IMET funds.204 Angola’s IMET value
during this period was $177,000; Namibia $1,589,000; Rwanda $1,425,000;
Uganda $3,856,000; and Zimbabwe $2,661,000.205 Although foreign
involvement in the Congo Conflict was extensive, indigenous factions
(rebels) formed within DR Congo.206 As a result, a highly nuanced
hybridization of civil war, proxy war, and international war was waged.

194. Zaire’s Mobutu Flees Kinshasa, CNN, May 16, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/
9705/16/mobuto.am/index.html?eref=sitesearch.
195. MEREDITH, supra note 105, at 533.
196. HARTUNG & MOIX, supra note 45.
197. MEREDITH, supra note 105, at 538.
198. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UPC CRIMES IN ITURI (2002-2003) (2006) [hereinafter UPC
CRIMES IN ITURI], http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/08/congo14517_txt.htm.
199. MEREDITH, supra note 105, at 539-40.
200. Id.
201. See id. 3.8 million deaths surpass the death toll of all other documented African
conflicts. Id.
202. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES, FOREIGN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY
ASSISTANCE FACTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1998, U. S. DEP’T OF DEF. (1999).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. UPC CRIMES IN ITURI, supra note 198.
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In July 1999 the parties, including the indigenous factions, signed the
Lusaka Accords.207 The Lusaka Accords called for the withdrawal of all
foreign elements from DR Congo, the disarmament of rebel groups not
party to the agreement (over fifty rebel leaders were party to the agreement), and the deployment of a peacekeeping force.208 The parties, however, fell far short of their promises and the fragile framework for peace
quickly fractured.209 The failure of the Lusaka Accords led to a rapid
growth in ethnic militarism throughout DR Congo.210 Eventually, the
various rebel-held zones were transformed into the rebel groups’
fiefdoms.211 Eastern DR Congo became the most factionalized area.212
Rebel groups of note in the area included the Front des Nationalists et
Integrationnistes (FNI) lead by Peter Karim, the Front de Resistance
Patriotique in Ituri (FRPI) lead by “Cobra” Matata, and the Mouvement
Revolutionnaire Congolais (MRC) lead by Matthieu Cui Ngudjolo.213
As the situation in DR Congo deteriorated the occupying countries saw
the potential to exploit its resources. Initially, Rwanda and Uganda squared
off with Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, but it was not long before even
the allies turned against each other in a fight for primacy over the spoils of
their conquest.214 During this period Rwanda, which does not produce
cobalt (used in the manufacture of cell phones), boasted $250 million in
cobalt exports.215 Similarly, Uganda, a country with virtually no mineral
wealth, began exporting diamonds while its troops occupied Eastern DR
Congo.216 The DR Congo brought Uganda’s actions to the attention of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1999, claiming that “by . . . providing
unlimited aid to rebels in the form of arms and armed troops, in return for
the right to exploit the wealth of the Congo for their own benefit, Uganda

207. CHARLES SNYDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION
OF AFRICA (2003), http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/20245.htm.
208. Id.
209. UPC CRIMES IN ITURI, supra note 198.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Letter from Jorge Voto-Bernales, Chairman of the Security Council Committee to the
President of the UN Security Council, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, at 11-12, UN Doc. S/2007/423 (July 18, 2007) [hereinafter Letter to UN Security
Council].
214. ARVIND GANESAN & ALEX VINES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENGINE OF WAR:
RESOURCES, GREED, AND THE PREDATORY STATE (2004), http://hrw.org/wr2k4/14.htm.
215. AYITTEY, supra note 160, at 210.
216. Id.
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has defied the international community and created a dangerous
precedent.”217 The ICJ agreed and found:
That the Republic of Uganda, by acts of looting, plundering and
exploitation of Congolese natural resources committed by
members of the Ugandan armed forces in the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and by its failure to comply
with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri district to
prevent acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese
natural resources, violated obligations owed to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo under international law[.]218
For almost a decade Eastern DR Congo was stripped of its gold,
diamonds, and timber in the race for political primacy in the region.219 The
feast on DR Congo’s mineral riches by these groups continues unabated,
although now the plunder is primarily perpetrated by rebel groups.220
Although the plunder of DR Congo’s resources is appalling, the most
grisly cost of the Congo Conflict is the loss in human life. The
International Rescue Committee (IRC) reported that from 1998 to 1999, 1.7
million lives were lost as a result of the conflict, 200,000 of which are
directly attributable to acts of violence.221 The deaths not attributable to
direct acts of violence were a result of opportunistic diseases, preying on
the collapse of health services and scarcity of food supplies.222 As a result
of the conflict, DR Congo is an unchecked incubation zone for disease.223
By 2007, the IRC estimated that 5.4 million people died as a result of the
Congo Conflict.224 Forty-seven percent were children.225
Laurent Kabila’s tenure as leader of DR Congo was short lived: he
was assassinated on January 16, 2001.226 There was little time for a power

217. Application Instituting Proceedings, Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 13 (June 1999),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/7151.pdf.
218. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. No. 116, ¶ 345 (Dec. 2006), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf.
219. Id. ¶ 241.
220. Press Release, UN Mission in DR Congo, Congo Afraid Bemba is Plotting Rebellion
(Aug. 20, 2007); Press Release, UN Mission in DR Congo, Rwanda, Uganda Urged to Help End
Congo Plundering (Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=9970.
221. Barbara Crossette, Death Toll in Congo’s 2-Year War is at Least 1.7 Million, Study
Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2000, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9407E7DB113F
F93AA35755COA9669C8B63.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. COGHLAN ET AL., supra note 102, at ii.
225. Id. at iii.
226. The Death of Laurent Desire Kabila, IRIN NEWS, http://www.irinnews.org/
webspecials/kabila/chronology.asp (last visited May 30, 2008).
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vacuum to develop as Laurent Kabila’s son, Joseph, quickly took his
father’s place.227 Joseph reversed many negative aspects of his father’s
rule. Under Joseph’s oversight, DR Congo achieved relative stability in the
later months of 2003 228 due to the withdrawal of foreign troops in
December 2002,229 and an agreement with the opposition parties for a transitional government and elections.230 Joseph also oversaw the passage of a
new constitution by the Congolese electorate in December 2005.231 The
new constitution passed with eighty-four percent of voters’ support.232 The
new government also honored its promises and in July 2006 Congolese
flocked to the polls for DR Congo’s first democratic election.233 In
November 2006, Joseph Kabila was declared the victor.234 Despite the first
free and fair election in the history of DR Congo, it is unclear if peace is in
its near future.235 Arms continue to flow into Eastern DR Congo from
Eastern Europe via Rwanda and Uganda despite an arms embargo, fueling
rebel groups and preventing effective control from the Kinshasa-based
government.236
E.

U.S. INTERESTS IN DR CONGO AND CONTINUED ARMS
TRANSFERS

Despite arms embargos imposed on DR Congo by the UN Security
Council in 2003, 2005, and 2006, arms are smuggled, circulated illicitly
internally, and embargoed material is stockpiled.237 Individual soldiers of
DR Congo’s armed forces routinely sell arms and ammunition to

227. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cg.html (last visited June 1, 2008) [hereinafter
The World Factbook].
228. Id.
229. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (2003),
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa3.html.
230. The World Factbook, supra note 227.
231. See Elections in Congo—Kinshasa, African Elections Database, http://africanelections.
tripod.com/cd.html (last visited May 30, 2008) (discussing the historical political profile of DR
Congo).
232. Id.
233. In 1970 the DR Congo held its first election. Id. It is unlikely that the 1970 election
would qualify as free and fair as Mobutu ran unopposed and had prohibited other political parties.
Id.
234. Congo on a Knife Edge, ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.economist.com/world/
mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8166114.
235. 10,000 DR Congo Refugees Enter Uganda, VOA NEWS, Aug. 22, 2007,
http://voanews.com/english/archive/2007-08/2007-08-22-voa41.cfm?CFID=2906779$cftoken=
10487538; At Least 12,000 Flee Fighting in Eastern DRC in Uganda: Military, UN Mission to
DR Congo, Dec. 6, 2006, http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=13348.
236. Letter to UN Security Council, supra note 213, at 10-12.
237. Id. at 10.
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supplement their income.238 Further, there have been reports of UN peacekeepers selling arms for gold in Eastern DR Congo.239 Enabled by nonexistent or corrupt customs authorities, Anatov planes continue to operate
with impunity in violations of the embargos.240
Notwithstanding over a decade of neglect, the United States purportedly views DR Congo as the key to stability in Central Africa.241 The
policy of the United States is to support the transitional government and
encourage peace, prosperity, democracy, and the respect for human
rights.242 The United States currently provides aid to DR Congo through
the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID).243 The State Department has requested $1.1 million in military
aid for DR Congo for 2008.244 Most of the requested aid for DR Congo,
however, is for institution building and health initiatives.245
The deleterious effects of previous U.S. military assistance and arms
sales to DR Congo and other corrupt and brutal governments are ubiquitous
throughout the developing world. Yet the United States continues to allow
arms sales and provides military assistance to questionable governments,
often with egregious human rights violations on their rap-sheets.246 Such
arms and military assistance are vital to the stability of the recipient government, affording it the ability to protect itself from internal and external
enemies and entrench itself in power.247
A substantive change in U.S. military assistance policy seems unlikely.
Congress recently enacted the American Service-Members Protection

238. Id. at 29.
239. Xan Rice, UN Troops in Congo ‘Traded Gold and Arms’, THE GUARDIAN, May 23,
2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/23/congo.international.
240. Letter to UN Security Council, supra note 213, at 25-26.
241. BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 9. According to the note, DR Congo’s “dominate
position in Central Africa makes stability in the [DR Congo] an important element of overall
stability in the region.” Id. The United States’ long term interests in the DR Congo include
seeking to “strengthen the process of internal reconciliation and democratization.” Id.
242. Id.
243. The World Factbook, supra note 227. Humanitarian development assistance provided
via USAID totals over $100 million per annum. Press Release, UN Mission in DR Congo, US
Ups Development Aid for DR Congo: USAID Chief (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.monuc.org/
news.aspx?newsID=16905.
244. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR FOREIGN
OPERATIONS 206-07 (2008), http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/110th/CBJ08.pdf [hereinafter
2008 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS].
245. Id.
246. RICHARD GRIMMETT, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS: CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS
TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 1996-2003 27 (2004), http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32547.pdf
[hereinafter GRIMMETT 1996-2003].
247. The importance of arms and military assistance in this context is a general and wellknown concept to political scientists.
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Act,248 which would cut military aid for any country that became party to
the Rome Statute, which is the charter document for the International
Criminal Court.249 With very limited exceptions under the Act, military aid
is only available for countries party to the Rome Statute which enter into
agreements with the United States pursuant to Article 98 (i.e., “Article 98
Agreements”).250 Article 98 Agreements prevent the International Criminal
Court from proceeding against U.S. personnel within the country’s
borders.251 An indicator of the significance of military aid to developing
countries is reflected by the large number of Article 98 Agreements entered
into with developing countries.252
Similarly, private market weapon sales to developing countries
continue to thrive. Although less than ten percent of U.S. weapons transfer
agreements with developing countries are made with African countries,
such transfer agreements are crucial to those countries.253 In terms of
absolute numbers, other countries’ weapons sales pale in comparison to
U.S. sales. For example, Germany had the largest total number of arms
agreements with African countries (15.8%), which totaled $1.5 billion,254
one-ninth of the value of U.S. arms sales agreements to African countries
($13.6 billion).255

248. American Service-Members Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. § 7426 (2008).
249. Id. § 7426(c).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Presidential Determination No. 2003-27 (June 30, 2003), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_04/other_04.html (proceed to document entitled
“Waiving Prohibition on United States Military Assistance to Parties to the Rome Statute
Establishing the International Criminal Court”). The majority of African countries party to the
Rome Statute have entered into Article 98 agreements with the U.S. Id. They are: Lesotho, DR
Congo, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Djibouti, Liberia, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Niger, South Africa,
Tanzania, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Benin, The Gambia, Mauritius, Botswana, Ghana,
Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, Central African Republic, Guinea, and Zambia. Id. Many of these
countries spend little over $200 million annually on defense. See, e.g., Library of Congress
Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Kenya, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/
Kenya.pdf (last visited June 1, 2008) (noting that Kenya expended $280 5 million on military
defense in 2005).
253. GRIMMETT 1996-2003, supra note 246, at 24.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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IV. ERRORS EVIDENT FROM THE PROVISION OF MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO DR CONGO
A. LEADERS OF RECIPIENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES MAY USE
CHILD SOLDIERS OR COMMIT OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
Laurent Kabila was known not only for his brief tenure as head of
government for DR Congo, but also for his use of child soldiers.256 The
FNI, FRPI, and MRC, a few of the numerous rebel groups in DR Congo,
consistently recruit and use children within their ranks.257 A number of the
leaders of the various rebel groups, which knowingly recruited and retained
child soldiers, are now incorporated into DR Congo’s armed forces
(FARDC).258 There are still an estimated 30,000 child soldiers serving in
militias throughout DR Congo.259 A UN Group of Experts on DR Congo
found the violation of international laws concerning children in armed
conflict to be endemic.260
Use of child soldiers in militias and rebel groups within unstable developing countries is hardly an anomaly. Where AK47s, M16s, grenades,
handguns, and pistols are readily available, the only concern is finding
someone to use them. During the Liberian civil war, the Liberian government was estimated to have recruited 21,000 child soldiers.261 The Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) based in Northern Uganda has also been cited for
using child soldiers, who are abducted from their villages and foisted into a
life of crime.262
There are an estimated 300,000 child soldiers worldwide.263 Use of
child soldiers directly contravenes the Convention on the Rights of the

256. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
CONGO (1999), http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/congo.htm. Note that Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, militia leader of the Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo, has been
indicted by the International Criminal Court. Judge Marilyn Kaman et al., International Legal
Developments in Review: 2006, 41 INT’L LAW. 317, 318 (2007). Lubanga’s case is the first where
the crime charged is solely for the use of child soldiers. See id. (noting that Lubunga’s trial is the
first time in international criminal law which allows for the participation of victims).
257. Letter to UN Security Council, supra note 213, at 11-12.
258. Id. at 12.
259. Karen Allen, Bleak Future for Congo’s Child Soldiers, BBC NEWS, July 25, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiafrica/5213996.stm.
260. Letter to UN Security Council, supra note 213, at 10.
261. Id.
262. See Amnesty Int’l, Cote d’Ivoire, Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, http://web.
amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR310032005?open&of=ENG-CIV (last visited May 30, 2008)
(stating that use of children as soldiers is a war crime).
263. UNICEF Fact Sheet: Child Soldiers, 2003, http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/
childsoldiers.pdf.
OF THE
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Child.264 In light of the basic human rights tenets concerning the prohibition of the use of child soldiers, which the United States promulgated and
continues to support,265 aiding regimes that use child soldiers violates U.S.
principles.
Human rights violations in African countries are almost too numerous
for review. The United States provided military assistance and U.S. companies sold arms to the vast majority of these countries.266 Many SubSaharan African countries violate their citizens’ fundamental political
rights. For example, Zimbabwe’s 2002 presidential election was set against
widespread, politically motivated violence instigated by Mugabe’s
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front.267 Predictably, Mugabe
was reelected.268 Mugabe went on to oust white farmers, demolish informal
housing developments, and restrict the availability of goods.269 Such
actions lead to shortages in basic needs amongst the population and served
as the impetus for refugee crises.270
Military assistance and arms transfers to human rights violators are not
just confined to Africa. Central American end users of arms transfers are
notorious for their poor human rights records.271 Southeast Asian countries
known for human rights violations have also had influxes of M16 rifles.272
Lebanon, home to Hezbollah and other Islamic fundamentalists, received

264. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, ¶ 38, UN GAOR, Supp. No.
49, UN Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm.
Article 38(2) obligates states to ensure that any person under fifteen does not take part in
hostilities. Id. Article 38(3) requires that state parties ensure that children below the age of fifteen
are not recruited for hostilities. Id. Furthermore, article 9(1) of the Child Convention obligates
state parties to ensure that “a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their
will.” Id. ¶ 9.
265. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t State, Human Rights,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/ (last visited May 30, 2008).
266. GRIMMETT 1998-2005, supra note 1, at 32.
267. ‘Climate of Fear’ in Zimbabwe Poll, BBC NEWS, Mar. 14, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/1872412.stm.
268. Id.
269. Rachel L. Swarns, Mugabe Remains Unyielding on Eviction of White Farmers, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at A6.
270. Zimbabwe: Government Reports 150% Drop in Living Standards, IRIN, Dec. 6, 2006,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=62338.
271. LORA LUMPE, THE US ARMS CENTRAL AMERICA—PAST AND PRESENT 1 (1999),
http://www.nisat.org/publications/us_arms_central_america.htm. From 1982 to 1991, the United
States dispensed 33,274 M16 assault rifles through the Excess Defense Articles program to El
Salvador. Id.
272. In 1997, Thailand received 37,500 M16s. See U.S. STATE DEP’T., BUREAU OF EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTES: THAILAND (2006), http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/ei/bgn/2814.htm (discussing the financial crisis which led to a loss of confidence in the
government). Less than a decade later, the Thai military ousted civilian leaders. Id.
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38,000 U.S. supplied M16s from 1980 to 1983 alone.273 U.S. arms transfers
also reached the Balkans.274
The FAA is not silent as to arms transfers to human rights abusers. In
the U.S. arms transfer schema, Section 2304 of the FAA provides that
military assistance may not be provided to any government “which engages
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”275 However, to determine whether a government consistently
violates human rights, Congress requires the President to consider whether
the government engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious
freedom.276 Other internationally recognized human rights, such as freedom from torture, genocide, and slavery did not warrant this special consideration.277 Congress reserved the right to request information regarding
countries’ human rights practices and the reason why military assistance is
continuing to be provided,278 which the State Department has thirty days to
produce.279 Section 2304 is rarely invoked to prohibit military assistance or
arms sales to human rights abusers.280
B. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO UNSTABLE COUNTRIES UNDERMINES THEIR
NEIGHBORS’ STABILITY
There are numerous militias and rebel groups in DR Congo. The use of
Eastern DR Congo as a rebel base threatens the security interests of neighboring countries. For example, Interahamwe attacks on Rwandan civilians
and troops, which are launched out of Eastern DR Congo have provoked the
government of Rwanda to respond by sending troops into DR Congo. 281
Further, the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) regularly received
military support from Uganda.282 Uganda has also been a longtime

273. LORA LUMPE, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, U.S. POLICY ON SMALL/LIGHT
ARMS EXPORTS (1997), http://fas.org/asmp/library/reports/AAAS.htm.
274. Id. From 1994 to 1996, M60 7.62 machine guns were transferred to Bosnia. Id.
275. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (2000).
276. Id. § 2304(a)(4)(A).
277. Id. § 2304.
278. Id. § 2304(c)(1)(A) – (D).
279. Id. § 2304(c)(1).
280. DIANNE E. RENNACK & ROBERT D. SHUEY, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS TO ACHIEVE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS: DISCUSSION AND GUIDE TO CURRENT
LAW 18-19 (1998).
281. GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, THE CONGO FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA: A
PEOPLE’S HISTORY 274 (2002).
282. SAVAGE, supra note 119, at 132.
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recipient of U.S. military aid.283 During the Congo Conflict, the MLC
controlled Northeastern DR Congo.284
Similar dynamics to those between Rwanda, Uganda, and DR Congo
are endemic to the developing world. In 2000, the United Nations was
bombarded with claims that West African nations were systematically subverting arms sanctions by smuggling arms across borders in exchange for
diamonds, timber, and other natural resources.285 The arms smuggling
enabled the embattled Charles Taylor to stay in power in Liberia for a
protracted period and to smuggle arms into Sierra Leone for a supporting
faction.286 This highly militarized situation resulted in civil wars in both
countries. The United States has also provided a substantial amount of
weaponry to Ethiopia. From 2005 to 2006, U.S. arms transfers to Ethiopia
were valued in excess of $19 million.287 For 2007, the stated value of arms
transfers was $10 million.288 Ethiopia is now well-equipped for intervention in Somalia and Eritrea. Ethiopia has fought several wars with Eritrea
in the past and border disputes continue.289 Ethiopia’s relations with
Somalia are likewise acrimonious. In January 2007, Ethiopia invaded
Somalia with the ostensible purpose of restoring the rightful government,
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is pro-Ethiopia.290
Despite the installation of the TFG, Ethiopian troops continue to occupy
Somalia.291
C. UNSTABLE COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO IMPLODE, THEREBY
GIVING SAFE HAVEN TO TERRORISTS
The United States has recognized the inherent danger of failed states.292
Examples of failed states that have provided safe harbor to terrorists include
283. HARTUNG & MOIX, supra note 45.
284. Id.
285. Barbara Crossette, Gem Sanctions South by UN are Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
2000, at A18.
286. Id.
287. William Church, Somalia: CIA Blowback Weakens East Africa, AMERICAN CHRONICLE, Oct. 23, 2006, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewAritcle.asp?articleID=15236.
288. Id.
289. Eritrea: Long-Term Refugees in Eastern Sudan Need Durable Solution, UN NEWS
SERVICE, Aug. 22, 2007, http://allafrica.com/storeis/200708221002.html.
290. STEPHANIE HANSON & EBEN KAPLAN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SOMALIA’S
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (2007), http://www.cfr.org/publication/12475.
291. Joanne Tomkinson, MEDIAWATCH: Somalia Heads For Crisis, Reuters AltertNet,
Mar. 12, 2008, http://www.alertnet.org/db/blogs/47985/2008/02/12-155516-1.htm.
292. The International Affairs Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2007: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 20 (2006) (statement of Condoleezza Rice, The Sec’y of
State, U.S. Dep’t of State) [hereinafter Hearing Before the Comm. on Int’l Relations]. “The failed
state is a real threat to our peace and security.” Id.
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Afghanistan and Somalia.293 Somalia is a largely militarized country that
was taken over by warlords in 1990.294 This fractionalized state now
houses al-Qaeda operatives.295 Incidents are on the rise of al-Qaeda and
other terrorist groups obtaining arms through illicit deals, posing a direct
threat to U.S. forces abroad.296 Although Somalia is under an arms
embargo,297 arms continue to pour in.298 From 2005 to 2006 the Central
Intelligence Agency funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to Somali
warlords.299 The warlords then used the money to buy weapons and continue to wreak havoc throughout the country.300
D. MORE PROSPEROUS COUNTRIES FOOT THE CLEAN-UP BILL
ANYWAY
In the aftermath of the Congo Conflict, the United Nations deployed a
peacekeeping force and an observer mission, the United Nations Mission to
the DR Congo (MONUC).301 MONUC is charged with collecting weapons
from civilians, scheduling and supervising the withdrawal of foreign forces,
providing protection to displaced persons, and supervising the transition to
democracy.302 For calendar year 2007 to 2008, MONUC had a budget of
over $1.1 billion.303 The same countries that previously provided military
assistance or allowed arms sales or transfers from domestic companies to
DR Congo now finance MONUC (e.g., the United States, France, and

293. See generally NAT’L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES 48 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (providing a
comprehensive study on the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks).
294. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: SOMALIA
(2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm.
295. Alex Perry, Somalia’s al-Qaeda Link, TIME, June 21, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1635830,00.html.
296. MATT SCHROEDER, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, SMALL ARMS, TERRORISM AND THE
OAS FIREARMS CONVENTION 15 (2004).
297. See S.C. Res. 733, ¶ 5, UN Doc. S/RES/733 (Jan. 23, 1992) (implementing an Arms
Embargo on Somalia).
298. See UN Doc. S/RES/1474 (Apr. 8, 2003) (reestablishing a panel to investigate violations
of arms embargo in Somalia).
299. Mark Mazzetti, Efforts by C.I.A. Fail in Somalia, Officials Charge, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2006, at A1.
300. Somalia: Fight for the Capital, 43 AFR. RES. BULL.: POL., SOC. & CULTURAL SERIES 5
(2006).
301. UN Mission in DR Congo, MONUC Mandate, http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?news
ID=11529&menuOpened=About%20MONUC.
302. Id.
303. MONUC and the Elections, supra note 11, at 1.
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Belgium).304 Furthermore, President Bush pledged $28 million to assist
refugees from DR Congo.305
Not only are undemocratic militarized African governments dangerous
to their populations and neighbors, they also present a high bill to the world
community in terms of peacekeeping efforts and humanitarian assistance
once they implode. Publicly funded international institutions (the United
Nations), individual countries (the United States), and private entities (e.g.,
the Red Cross and Save the Children), pour billions of dollars into what
appears to be an abyss.306 In light of budgetary considerations, it may prove
more efficient to simply stop providing military assistance and allow U.S.
arms dealers to sell to African countries with questionable human rights
records and a tenuous hold on democracy.307
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States dominates the arms transfer industry.308 The United
States asserts that it has the most comprehensive arms transfer regulations
in the world.309 With minor alterations, the U.S. system will set the example for other countries as to what comprises a sound regulatory regime.
Additionally, as the United Nations attempts to formulate an international
arms transfer regime, the United States should not forfeit its leadership
position.
As a threshold matter, the U.S. State Department should consider
creating a Bureau of Arms and Military Assistance Transfers (BAMAT).
Under the new framework any proposed FAA transfer would flow solely
through BAMAT before seeking congressional approval. BAMAT would
examine reports regarding human rights violations and democratic
indicators as they apply to a proposal for military assistance or an arms sale,
304. MONUC Facts and Figures, supra note 11.
305. Id.
306. As of July 2006, ninety-two peacekeepers had lost their lives while serving MONUC.
MONUC and the Elections, supra note 11, at 1.
307. International expert on humanitarian issues Francis Deng has noted that developed
states appear to be more comfortable footing the clean-up bill than aggressively pursuing political
solutions. Sarah E. Hager, Zimbabwe: Why the United Nations, State, and Non-State Actors
Failed to Effectively Regulate Mugabe’s Policy of Internal Displacement, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
221, 233 (2007) (quoting Bemma Donkoh, A Half-Century of International Refugee Protection:
Who’s Responsible, What’s Ahead?, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 260, 265 (2000)).
308. Arms Trade Key Statistics, BBC NEWS, Sept. 15, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/4238644.stm. In the United States alone, arms deliveries by private persons were valued
at $18.5 billion in 2004. Id. The leading competitor, Russia, accounted for a mere $4.6 billion.
Id.
309. U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND
PAPER: THE U.S. APPROACH TO COMBATING THE SPREAD OF SMALL ARMS (2001),
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2001/3766.htm.
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which would ideally remedy inconsistencies between State Department
Human Rights Reports and Budget Justifications.310 Moreover, BAMAT
would be the point of contact between the Commerce Department and the
State Department. Better coordination may lead to, at minimum, a more
consistent policy toward recipient countries. Preferably better coordination
would lead to improved control over which countries receive military aid
and assistance and ensure that those on the receiving end will use such
resources appropriately. The following statutory and treaty recommendations would operate most effectively under BAMAT.
A. AMEND THE FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961
The Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1961 should be amended to
require that the President find, in his or her Presidential Justifications, that
the recipient countries are democratic.311 Democratic countries are less
likely to go to war, largely due to the need for leaders to convince their
constituencies that war is in their best interests.312 Democratic countries
also are unlikely to routinely commit grave human rights violations.313 For
these reasons and others, promoting the democratization of developing
countries has been a consistent U.S. policy goal.314 Congress may guide

310. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR,
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/ (last visited May 30, 2008) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS]. The Under-Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs is responsible for country
reports on human rights practice, while the Deputy Secretary of State for Resource Management is
responsible for the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations. Id.
311. Pillars of democracy include: sovereignty of the people, government based upon the
consent of the governed, majority rule, minority rights, guarantee of basic human rights, free and
fair elections, equality before the law, and due process of law. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DEFINING
DEMOCRACY, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdmz.htm (last visited Aug. 2,
2008).
312. Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford University: Why
Democracy Is an International Issue (June 19, 2001).
313. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The 2002-2003 Peltason Lecture at the University of California,
Irvine: Democracy and Human Rights—The Essential Connection (July 1, 2003).
314. HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 310.
Because the promotion of human rights is an important national interest, the United
States seeks to . . . [p]romote greater respect for human rights, including freedom from
torture, freedom of expression, press freedom, women’s rights, children’s rights and
the protection of minorities, [p]romote the rule of law, seek accountability and change
cultures of impunity.
Id.
[D]emocracy is more than a single election, or even a succession of them. It is a way
of life for a nation embracing its life and institutions, and all their complexity and
embraced in turn by its people and their actions, thoughts and beliefs. . . . [We] should
not readily believe that without an enduring American presence, democracy can be so
easily implanted and nourished in societies where history and experience suggest it is
quite alien.
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this determination by setting statutory factors for the President to consider.
For a country to qualify as democratic it should have at least five years of
experience with democratic government or at least one election cycle,
whichever is the later. Although five years is not a substantial period of
time, it generally is enough time for democratic institution building to
begin. The present FAA requirement that recipient countries do not violate
or condone serious human rights abuses should be extended to a look-back
period of five years. By amending the FAA, the State Department could no
longer request military aid funding for human rights violators or countries
with poor democratic track records. If such changes are implemented,
neighbors of countries engaged in open conflicts in developing countries
will most likely not qualify for military assistance.315
B. AMEND THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT 316
The AECA should be amended to mirror the proposed changes to the
FAA. The same process for determining the democratic status of a country
should be used in the FAA and AECA. Likewise, there should be the same
look-back period of five years to determine if a country has had serious
human rights violations.
Under the AECA, when deciding whether to issue an export license for
sale to a foreign government, the State Department should additionally
examine the country of residence of a private buyer. When examining the
recipient country or to where the articles on the Munitions List are destined,
the State Department should prohibit export to countries that are not
considered democratic and/or have had serious human rights violations in
the past five years. When examining the export of articles on the Munitions
List, the State Department should consider the additional factors of whether
the articles would be used in committing human rights abuses and whether
they would prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms
control, including light weapons control, nonproliferation, or other
arrangements.
Hearing Before the Comm. on Int’l Relations, supra note 292, at 7-11 (statement of Henry Hyde,
Chairman of the Comm. on Int’l Relations), http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/
hfa26078.000/hfa26078_0 htm. See also President George W. Bush, Address at Inaugural
Ceremony (Jan. 20, 2005) (“[I]t is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of
ending tyranny in our world.”).
315. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DOCUMENT BY COUNTRY, http://hrw.org/
countries.html (select the DR Congo’s neighbors) (chronicling human rights violations and
country conditions). All of DR Congo’s neighbors—Uganda, Zambia, Angola, Republic of the
Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi—consistently violate human
rights or are not considered democratic. Id.
316. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (West 2008).
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C. SUPPORT, SIGN, AND RATIFY AN ARMS TRADE TREATY
Small arms are increasingly the weapons of choice in modern day
warfare.317 Small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) have played significant
roles in conflicts in Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia,
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.318 The availability
and use of SA/LW adds to the causes of conflict and generates a vicious
circle in which greater insecurity further increases the demand for, and use
of, these weapons.319
The international community does not have a treaty regime to regulate
the traffic in SA/LW (e.g., an arms trade treaty).320 To address the myopia,
in 2001, the United Nations convened a conference on Illicit Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.321 The conference convened
in New York on July 9, 2001.322 Participants at the conference agreed on a
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.323 Attendees pledged to
improve or implement measures in their countries, to communicate with
other countries on the issue, to designate a national agency to address illicit
arms trafficking, and to criminalize trafficking in illicit arms.324
The U.S. representative at the conference, John Bolton, indicated a
willingness only to discuss regulation of military arms.325 He was

317. Elise Keppler, Preventing Human Rights Abuses by Regulating Arms Brokering: The
U.S. Brokering Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 381, 385
(2001). Conflicts are increasingly intrastate, waged by non-state actors such as armed militias,
insurgents, and criminal gangs. Id.
318. See Michael Fleshman, Small Arms in Africa: Counting the Cost of Gun Violence, 15
AFRICA RECOVERY 1, 1 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/
vol15no4/154arms.htm (stating that small arms are killing Africans in increasing numbers).
319. Owen Greene, et al., Light Weapons and Peacebuilding in Central and East Africa, in
INT’L ALERT REPORT 31 (1998).
320. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime on Work of Its Twelfth Session, G.A. Res. 383, ¶ 33, UN GAOR,
55th Sess., UN Doc. A/55/383/Add.2 (2001), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/final_instruments/
383ale.pdf (summarizing the progress of the international community towards an international
agreement on SA/LW). There are fifty-five state parties to the Protocol. Id. The United States has
not signed this Protocol, nor has it ratified the underlying treaty on the Transnational Crime
Convention. Id.
321. See UN GAOR, 54th Sess., 80th Plen. Mtg. at 40-43, UN Doc. A/RES/54/54 (Dec. 15,
1999) (deciding to convene the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects).
322. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, July 9-20, 2001, ¶ 1, UN Doc. A/CONF.192/15.
323. Id. at 7.
324. Id. at 10.
325. John R. Bolton, U.S. Statement at Plenary Session Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security Affairs, UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (July 9, 2001), available at http://www.un.int/usa/01_104.htm.
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unwilling to discuss SA/LW.326 Bolton cited U.S. controls via the AECA
and ITAR as the benchmark in regulating SA/LW.327 He stated that the
AECA and ITAR are sufficient to address the problem for the United
States.328 Bolton further elaborated that the United States does not support
any course of action that constrains the legal trade and manufacture of small
arms.329
In the seven years following the initial conference, several events of
international significance occurred. The United States was attacked by a
transnational terrorist group on its own soil;330 the United States invaded
Afghanistan;331 and the United States invaded Iraq.332 In each of these
situations, U.S. forces faced (and continue to face) guerilla combatants/
insurgents using SA/LW on an unprecedented scale.333 Perhaps in recognition of the significant role SA/LW play in conflicts, the State Department
has equivocated in its position on an arms trade treaty.
Evidence of the undulation in U.S. policy regarding an arms trade
treaty may be seen in speeches given by State Department officials. In an
April 12, 2005 speech to the Organization of American States SA/LW
meeting, Ambassador Robert Loftis remarked that the United States
supports all aspects of the 2001 UN Program of Action on Illicit Trade of
Small Arms and Light Weapons.334 Ambassador Loftis said that the July
2006 biennial meeting of states on SA/LW should focus on finalizing an
international instrument that will facilitate the monitoring of arms trafficking.335 He further remarked that the United States sees an arms trade treaty

326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Harold Hongju Koh, A World Drowning in Guns, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2347-48.
Professor Koh termed Bolton’s caveats to a Small Arms Treaty as “Bolton’s Do Nots.” Id. The
“Do Nots” include:
We do not support measures that would constrain legal trade. . . . [We] do not support
the promotion of international advocacy. . . . We do not support measures limiting
trade in SA/LW solely to governments. . . . The United States will not support a
mandatory Review Conference. . . . The United States will not join consensus on a
final document that contains measures abrogating the Constitutional right to bear
arms.
Id.
330. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 293, at 48.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. John Diamond, Insurgents Give U.S. Valuable Training Tool, USA TODAY, Jan. 25,
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-01-25-insurgent-videos_x.htm.
334. Ambassador Robert G. Loftis, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticalMilitary Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks to the Organization of American States Small
Arms/Light Weapons Meeting (Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/44625.htm.
335. Id.
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as facilitating the timely, reliable identification and tracing of illicit small
arms and light weapons.336
Despite such untoward indications regarding an arms trade treaty, on
October 27, 2006, the United States was the lone country out of 164 to vote
against a proposal to draft an arms trade treaty in the Disarmament and
International Security Committee.337 From a statement given by Richard
Grenell, a spokesperson for the U.S. mission to the United Nations, it
appears that U.S. policy has returned to that promulgated by Ambassador
Bolton in 2001. Mr. Grenell cited higher U.S. standards than what an arms
trade treaty would likely contain as the central reason for U.S. opposition.338 Mr. Grenell stated that all countries should have to agree on an
international standard regarding an arms treaty before drafting may commence.339 Mr. Grenell did not mention the reasons why the United States is
forgoing the opportunity to assist in setting the standard for an international
regime. Further, Mr. Grenell did not clarify why a lower standard would
prevent the United States from becoming a state party to the treaty.
Logically, by ratifying a treaty with lower standards then our current
regime, the United States would not have to go through the onerous process
of executing the treaty,340 and a possibly contentious ratification process.341
Notwithstanding U.S. resistance to an arms trade treaty, other countries
have continued to pursue the matter. The UN General Assembly passed a
resolution regarding a comprehensive arms trade treaty in December
2006.342 The United States abstained from the vote.343 More recently, in a
call for country views on an arms trade treaty, ninety-four countries

336. Id. A SA/LW treaty is a tool for tracing illicit SA/LW, and presents a problem for
earlier U.S. policy objections to registration requirements. Tracing of illicit weapons will only be
accomplished through a registration requirement. INTERPOL Anniversary Highlights Cooperation With UN to Fight Terrorism, INTERPOL, Nov. 4, 2005, http://www.interpol.int/Public/News/
2005/UNanni20051104.asp.
337. Irwin Arieff, UN Panel Backs New Treaty on Global Arms Trade, REUTERS, Oct. 26,
2006,
http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=N26250543&WTmodLoc=
IntNewsHome_C4_Crises-6.
338. UN Arms Control Resolution Approved, MWC NEWS, Oct. 27, 2006, http://
mwcnews.net/content/view/10459/51/.
339. Id.
340. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 163 n.34 (2d Cir. 2003).
341. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2.
342. See UN GAOR, 61st Sess., UN Doc. A/C.1/61/L.55 (Oct. 12, 2006) (deciding to include
an agenda “[t]owards an arm trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the
import, export and transfer of conventional arms”).
343. UN Assembly Adopts ATT Resolution, IANSA, Dec. 2006, http://www.iansa.org/
un/2006/GAvote.htm.
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submitted their views before the June 20, 2007 deadline.344 The United
States did not submit its view.
The U.S. experience in implementing a comprehensive set of arms
regulations, which include monitoring conditions in end-user countries and
activities of domestic arms dealers, may provide valuable insight in drafting
an arms trade treaty. Additionally, assisting in drafting an arms trade treaty
would further the current U.S. policy objective of transformational
diplomacy.345
VI. CONCLUSION
This article focused on the inconsistencies and counter-productiveness
of the current U.S. arms export regime. This article demonstrated the
danger of continuing to provide military assistance and allowing arms sales
to unstable, undemocratic countries that violate human rights. The danger
centers on the likelihood that the military assistance and arms will be used
to commit human rights violations. Depending on the scale of the
violations, the United States and other western countries pay the onerous
clean-up bill. Furthermore, military assistance and arms sales to developing
countries with a large number of anti-American extremists may increase the
threat to U.S. national security interests.
To prevent the mistakes of the past from recurring, lessons must be
learned. The Congo Conflict serves as a reminder that the provision of
military aid and arms to unstable leaders, even those aligned with U.S.
interests, may lead to gross human rights abuses, failed states, and an
expensive clean-up bill. Negative effects from U.S. arms transfers may be
avoided through procedural and substantive changes to the FAA and
AECA. Further, amending the FAA and the AECA, coordinating regulatory efforts from one bureau within the State Department, BAMAT, and
joining the international community in an arms trade treaty will allow the
United States to meet its stated foreign policy objectives.

344. More Success for the Arms Trade Treaty Campaign, IANSA, June 29, 2007,
http://www.iansa.org/campaigns_events/move_att_success.htm.
345. Secretary Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Dep’t of State, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee: Realizing the Goals of Transformational Diplomacy (Feb. 15, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/61209.htm. Secretary Rice defined the objective in transformational democracy as working “with our many partners around the world to build and sustain
democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct
themselves responsibly in the international system.” Id.

